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PREFACE 
The paper is an overview of the regulatory framework related to personal data protection in 
Georgia. It provides detailed analysis of the present legal instrument – Law of Georgia on 
Personal Data Protection and focuses on its main strengths and weaknesses. Also, it dis-
cusses basic differences and similarities between EU and Georgian regulatory instruments 
and presents their comparative analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For most of us our daily life is almost impossible without an Internet, where we create our 
own virtual world by sharing various kinds of personal data. On the internet we do almost 
the same activities as we do in the real world. Whenever we buy products on the Internet, 
book flight tickets, register ourselves on the social networking websites or use Internet 
banking we reveal most of our personal information such as our name, gender, age, bank 
card details and some other private data that have significant importance for our lives. 
There is a legitimate question that should bother all of us: "What happens to this data? 
Could it fall into the wrong hands? What rights do you have regarding your personal in-
formation? "1 
Personal information is an indivisible part of one’s privacy and privacy itself is recognized 
as a fundamental human right by various legal instruments. "Our current understanding of 
informational privacy is based to some extent on how an individual relates to and controls 
access to information about themselves. Regulations and legislation have codified what 
Judge Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis summarized in 1890 as the right of the individu-
al to "be let alone"2, and expanded the notion of data protection beyond the fundamental 
right to privacy."3 
In order to protect our privacy we should be able to protect and control our personal infor-
mation. Therefore various national and international normative instruments are based on a 
set of conditions or principles that include: 
• Individuals should be informed when personal data is collected. 
• Individuals should be told who is requesting the data and the reason for their re-
quest to help them decide whether to release control of all or part of such data. 
                                                 
 
1
 Protection of personal data, available here: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm; Ac-
cessed 20.11.2013 
2
 Warren, S.D and Brandeis, L.D. The Right to Privacy Harvard Law Review Boston Vol. IV No. 5 Dec 15; 
1890 
3
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009 
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• Individuals should be told how they can access data about themselves in order to 
verify its accuracy and request changes. 
• Individuals should be told how their data will be protected from misuse. 
Implementing these conditions is not easy, particularly in today’s world, where personal 
data is collected, processed and transferred in vast amounts, either on behalf of the individ-
uals themselves (e.g. by the state to preserve security or improve public services) or for the 
benefit of commercial organizations. In such an environment, these principles must be ob-
served in an effective way, guaranteeing the respect of the data subject’s rights without 
overloading him with formal information in quantities that he cannot realistically be ex-
pected to process or comprehend.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
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CHAPTER I   ̶̶̶̶ PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN EU 
1.1 EU Directive 
1.1.1 Introduction 
"At the European level, the protection of privacy as an essential human right has been en-
cased in a number of regulatory texts, most of which came into being after the Second 
World War. The tragedies and atrocities of this period, when large databases of personal 
data were used to segregate populations, target minority groups and facilitate genocide, 
made it abundantly clear how dangerous it could be to allow public intrusion into the pri-
vate sphere. 
The post-war period witnessed the arrival of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UN, 1948), the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950), and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN, 1966), all of which recog-
nized privacy as a fundamental human right and focused principally on shielding the indi-
vidual against abuse by protecting their personal data. 
The private sector began to use personal data extensively following the arrival and broad 
uptake of Information, Communication Technology (ICT) in the 1970s. This increased the 
risk of personal data being abused and created concern that there would be a need for regu-
lation to ensure that individuals remained adequately protected. Hence more specific regu-
lations were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to govern personal data processing, both at 
an international and a national level. 
There was little harmonization between these rules at an EU level. Some Member States 
applied strict limitations and procedures, whereas other Member States had no rules at all. 
This diversity constituted a barrier to the development of the internal market (the "first pil-
lar"), and it was in this context that the Directive was created: as an internal market instru-
ment designed to improve cross-border trade by harmonizing data protection legislation."5 
                                                 
 
5
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009. p. 6 
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The EU has adopted several Directives on data protection. The first and most important of 
these is Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data. This instrument is binding on 
E.U. member states, albeit with several qualifications, the most significant being that the 
Directive does not apply to activities relating to "public security, defence, State security ... 
and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law" (Article 3(2)). At the same time, 
though, member states are free to subject such activities to data protection regimes mod-
elled on the Directive. Certain non-member states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) that 
are party to the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area (E.E.A.) are also bound 
to implement the Directive, with the same qualifications as just noted.6 
One of the crucial characteristics of the Directive is that it is tied to the concept of personal 
data, and not to a notion of privacy. Indeed, the provisions of the Directive can apply to 
acts of data processing which are not considered to be privacy sensitive in their own right. 
The Directive, therefore, serves a number of purposes, privacy protection being only one. 
Its rules fulfill a range of functions in practice, including encouraging freedom of expres-
sion, preventing discrimination and improving efficiency.7 
While the Directive is primarily a European instrument for European states, it exercises 
considerable influence over other countries not least because it places a qualified prohibi-
tion on transfer of personal data to those countries unless they provide "adequate" levels of 
data protection (see Articles 25–26). As shown below, many non-European countries are 
passing legislation in order, at least partly, to meet this adequacy criterion. Furthermore, the 
Directive stipulates that the data protection law of an E.U. state may apply outside the E.U. 
in certain circumstances, most notably if a data controller, based outside the E.U., utilizes 
"equipment" located in the state to process personal data for purposes other than merely 
                                                 
 
6
 Lee A. Bygrave. Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective. 2010 
7
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 7 
 6
transmitting the data through that state (see Article 4(1)(c)). All of these provisions give an 
impression that the E.U., in effect, is legislating for the world.8 
The influence of the Directive on data processing practices is undeniable: its principles 
have set the standard for the legal definition of personal data, regulatory responses to the 
use of personal data and other ‘innovations in data protection policy’.9 These include clari-
fying the scope of data protection rules, defining rights for data subjects, establishing the 
provisions regarding sensitive personal data and establishing supervisory authorities and 
transnational oversight arrangements in the form of the EU level Article 29 Working Party. 
However, it is also important to realize that the Directive was written at a time when data 
processing involved filing systems and computer mainframes. The risks related to such a 
model could easily be managed by defining obligations and procedures linked to each role. 
Its main objective was to harmonize existing regulations to safeguard the data subject’s 
right to informational privacy and to create a common European market for the free move-
ment of personal data, not to create a legal framework that could cope with future data pro-
cessing and privacy challenges.10 
The world has now moved on to a networked society where personal data is continuously 
collected, enriched, amended, exchanged and reused. It is clear that this new social envi-
ronment needs well-adjusted data protection regulations to address the far greater risks of 
abuse. This leads to the question: is the current Directive, with its roots in a largely static 
and less globalised environment, still sufficiently flexible to handle the challenges of to-
day?11 
The Directive comprises 34 Articles and its provisions include data quality, special catego-
ries of processing, the rights of data subjects, confidentiality, security, liability and sanc-
tions, codes of conduct and supervisory authorities. It shares a number of basic concepts 
                                                 
 
8
 Lee A. Bygrave. Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective. 2010 
9
 Bennett C.J. and Raab, C. The Governance of Privacy: policy instruments in a global perspective; 2nd Edi-
tion, MIT Press, London 2006. p 97 
10
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 7 
11
 Ibid 
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with other regulatory texts, such as the 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines and the more recent 
Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) Privacy Framework. While the Directive was not 
conceptually innovative, it has had a very powerful impact in the EU and can be credited 
with creating a binding and harmonized framework for data protection principles in all 
Member States.12 
However, data protection in Europe is not solely dependent on state-initiated regulation. 
Self-regulatory approaches are increasingly common, and include sector specific codes of 
conduct at national and international levels, the conclusion of contracts implementing bind-
ing Model Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) to cover the exchange of personal 
data with a party outside of the European Union,13 and identity management to deal with 
challenges such as data ownership, data stewardship and data broking at a non-regulatory 
level. The Directive acknowledges and encourages these practices.14 
Finally, when examining the societal value of personal data, the fact that personal data pro-
tection has an inherent value to society in itself should not be overlooked. Exercising such 
freedoms as the freedom of speech, freedom of association and the freedom to practice re-
ligion in a meaningful way requires that the individual has a suitable personal sphere to 
develop his or her convictions and decide how to exercise these. Privacy rights thus can act 
as a vehicle to exercise other rights.15 Privacy protection is therefore not only essential as a 
safeguard for personal wellbeing, but also to ensure the needed freedom and creativity that 
may benefit society as a whole. Thus, for the purposes of defining more or less stringent 
data protection rules, the debate cannot be posed purely in terms of trading personal free-
                                                 
 
12
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 7 
13
 See e.g. Working Party document WP 108, « Working Document establishing a model checklist application 
for approval of Binding Corporate Rules”, adopted on 14 April 2005; 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp108_en.pdf  
14
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 8 
15
 Feinberg, J. Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays; Princeton University Press. 1994, p248 
 8
dom for societal benefit. Privacy and data protection should not be characterized as a zero 
sum gain where an individual gain means a societal loss or vice versa.16 
Circumstances have changed fundamentally since the European Data Protection Directive 
was created. The fluidity of personal data collections has increased as the scope, goals and 
ownership of such data continuously evolve. European citizens are becoming increasingly 
involved in managing their own data (e.g. by choosing permitted recipients or allowing 
preferred applications to re-use their data) through social networks, an interesting avenue of 
control that was not envisaged by the Directive.17 
As was noted above, the Directive’s scope is very closely tied to the notion of personal 
data, which is defined in the Directive in fairly strict terms, based on the linkability to indi-
vidual data subjects. Using this notion as a building block, specific roles are defined in ad-
dition to that of the data subject, including those of the data controller and data processor, 
which are linked to specific acts of data processing (i.e. a controller in one act of data pro-
cessing may become a processor in the next). Rights and obligations are defined in relation 
to these roles, including specific processes (information obligations, notifications, adequa-
cy findings, etc.) to ensure that general data protection principles are observed.18 
Generally, it is clear that there is a need for a flexible framework that allows data control-
lers to create and offer products and services at an international scale, while ensuring that 
data subjects retain their right to efficient data protection through effective enforcement 
and accountability mechanisms. This requires a legal framework that is sufficiently focused 
on real data protection impact and practical outcomes.19 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
16
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 16 
17
 Ibid, p. 18 
18
 Ibid, p. 19 
19
 Ibid 
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1.1.2 Main Strengths 
Strength Evidence 
Serves as reference 
model for good practice 
Legislation that permits practical exercise of fundamental rights 
derived from ECHR, and considered a leading international 
model. 
Other privacy legislations adopt elements from the Directive e.g. 
Hong Kong, Canada, parts of Latin America 
Harmonizes data 
protection principles 
and to a certain extent 
enables an internal 
market for personal 
data 
Implementation of legal rules across Europe for personal data 
processing that have greater compatibility than prior to the Di-
rective’s introduction 
Flexible due to a 
principles-based 
framework 
The Directive defines principles, without going into details for 
specific sectors/contexts. The exception to this rule is direct mar-
keting 
Technology neutral 
No reference to specific technologies 
Security measures not specified 
Concept of personal data broad enough to be technologically 
neutral 
Improves general 
awareness of privacy 
issues 
Establishment and increasing numbers of privacy policies, priva-
cy officers, etc. 
Consumer awareness regarding privacy20 
 
 
The Directive as a reference model for good practice 
One of the most frequently quoted positive aspects of the Directive was the impact it has 
had in structuring and organizing the debate surrounding data protection. While the OECD 
Guidelines were very influential in shaping this debate, the Directive can be credited with 
                                                 
 
20
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 22 
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formulating legally binding rules that have become effective law across the Member States, 
following in the footsteps of the Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.21 
As a result, the Directive is internationally respected, and its principles are often held up as 
a standard for good data protection practices even in contexts where it does not apply di-
rectly. Indeed, the APEC Privacy framework is one example where the provisions of the 
Directive have had a clear influence.22 
A number of other jurisdictions are considering legislative reform based on the Directive. 
These include Hong Kong and several jurisdictions in Latin America, including Chile and 
Ecuador. The Directive was illustrative in inspiring Canada to develop its own Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Other examples of the 
Directive’s influence can be found in the way that it has inspired the creation and recogni-
tion of the importance of supervisory authorities. The OECD refers to such bodies as Priva-
cy Enforcement Authorities – reflecting a slightly different perspective of their role, em-
phasizing their enabling role as privacy enforcers especially in a cross border context – and 
has recently developed a framework to facilitate co-operation among them.23 
 
 
Harmonizing data protection principles and enabling an internal market for personal data 
One of the key goals of the Directive was to improve the harmonization of data protection 
rules across Member States, in order to ensure the right to privacy with respect to the pro-
cessing of personal data and to permit the free flow of personal data between Member 
States (Article 1 of the Directive). The aim was to create a sufficiently harmonized Europe-
an legal framework so that data controllers managed personal data in accordance with the 
                                                 
 
21
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 22 
22
 Ibid 
23
 OECD, “Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy” 
(2007) available at: www.oecd.org/sti/privacycooperation  
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same principles in any Member State, and data subjects would have clear rights regardless 
of where they or the data controller were located.24 
The Directive has ensured that broadly comparable legal rules for crucial aspects of per-
sonal data processing are in place throughout the EU. These include the concept of personal 
data, requirements for legitimacy, data quality and security, data subjects’ rights and the 
possibility of enforcing these rules, as described by Korff.25 
 
 
Flexibility due to a principles-based framework 
Many of the Directive’s obligations remain relatively high level. The framework approach 
based on principles allows Member States to implement the necessary measures while tak-
ing into account local traditions and sensitivities, and the needs of specific sectors.26 
This flexibility can be seen in the case of direct marketing. It was observed during inter-
views with representatives from the direct marketing sector that Northern European coun-
tries are more open to direct marketing and legislate accordingly, while Southern European 
countries have more formal and stricter sets of rules. While the Directive itself contains 
certain restrictions with regard to personal data processing in the context of direct market-
ing – most notably the data subject’s right to object to such data processing as foreseen in 
Article 14(b) – other aspects of direct marketing continue to diverge, and this national di-
vergence (as a reflection of differing societal attitudes) was, perhaps surprisingly, charac-
terized during these interviews as acceptable and even beneficial.27 
                                                 
 
24
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 23 
25
 Korff, D. EC Study on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive - comparative summary of 
national laws; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/univessexcomparativestudy_en.pdf  
26
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 24 
27
 Ibid 
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Technology neutral 
"The definition of personal data has been left deliberately abstract so that it can be applied 
in a number of technological contexts. The definition relies on considerations of ‘content’, 
‘purpose’ and ‘result’, and can thus be applied to biometric data, behavioral data or charac-
teristics that may be assigned by a data controller (e.g. passport number). The Opinions of 
the Article 29 Working Party on RFID and on the concept of personal data, and the re-
sponses to the 2002 Implementation Review concerning audio-visual information, attest to 
this flexibility. 
The legal framework is therefore not limited to a specific societal and technological con-
text, and so national data protection authorities can clarify how the Directive’s provisions 
should be applied in each context, if needed. The Article 29 Working Party thus provides 
European level interpretations when required."28 
 
 
Fostering a greater general awareness of privacy issues 
"The inclusion of data protection considerations in bilateral trade negotiations between the 
EU and other countries (e.g. South Africa, Mexico and Thailand) indicates that awareness 
of data protection is improving. Agreements currently being negotiated between the Euro-
pean Commission and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Central Africa are be-
ing amended to point to the Directive instead of OECD and UN principles. 
The Directive raises awareness by stating high level goals and the way in which these goals 
should be achieved, and by promoting data protection tools that include notification, model 
contracts, standard contractual clauses, privacy policies and the appointment of Data Pro-
tection Officers. Notification, for instance, promotes the transparency goal by requiring that 
                                                 
 
28
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 24 
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Data Controllers provide information about the data processing methods they intend to use 
and obliging them to make sure their data protection practices comply with the Directive. 
The transparency provisions have also helped individuals become more aware of privacy 
issues, especially regarding notice, consent, and choice. Interest and awareness29 is demon-
strated by responses from customers when notified about changes in privacy practices, and 
direct communications about uses of their personal data."30 
 
 
 
 
1.1.3 Main Weaknesses 
Weakness Evidence 
The link between the 
concept of personal 
data and real risks is 
unclear 
The application scope of the Directive depends too strongly on 
whether or not the data processed can be defined as “personal” 
data. It is all or nothing: there is no room for “more or less per-
sonal” data (and accordingly “more or less protection”). Special 
categories of personal data processing are explicitly defined; but 
financial information and location data are not classified as sensi-
tive. 
Strict application of the Directive’s concepts sometimes leads to 
unpredictable or counterintuitive results. 
Measures aimed at 
providing transparency 
of data processing 
through better 
information and 
notification are 
inconsistent and 
Privacy policies not read in practice, as they are aimed at con-
sumers yet written by/for lawyers 
Privacy policies do not play a role as a market differentiator 
Unclear purpose of notification 
Variety of 20 different notification processes, variety of exemp-
tion rules 
Uneven implementation of the process of registration 
                                                 
 
29
 See generally Eurobarometer Report on Data Protection in the European Union: Citizens' perceptions, 
published at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm  
30
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 24-25 
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ineffective 
The rules on data ex-
port and transfer to 
third countries are out-
moded 
Definition of ‘third countries’ is perceived as outmoded in the 
light of globalization 
Adequacy of countries is not relevant to business realities or to 
data protection 
Regulation in some other countries is stronger than the EU, but 
still not recognized as adequate 
The tools providing for 
transfer of data to third 
countries are 
cumbersome 
Length of time and effort required to get Standard Contractual 
Clauses, model contracts or Binding Corporate Rules approved is 
excessive 
Uneven practices of approval and authorization; too little coordi-
nation between the Member States 
The role of DPAs in 
accountability and 
enforcement is 
inconsistent 
Unclear rationale for enforcement 
Uneven implementation of enforcement across Member States 
either for punishment or to affect behaviors 
Differing criteria for imposing sanctions 
The definition of enti-
ties involved in pro-
cessing and managing 
personal data is sim-
plistic and static 
Globalization and increased re-use of personal data has outpaced 
the static definitions of controller and processor.31 
 
 
The link between the concept of personal data and real privacy risks is unclear 
"The scope of the Directive has been criticized because the relationship between privacy 
protection and data protection is vague: not all acts of personal data processing as covered 
by the Directive have a clear or noticeable privacy impact, and we must ask if this is a 
weakness in its focus. Should the impact on privacy be a relevant criterion for determining 
the applicability of data protection rules? 
                                                 
 
31
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 26 
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The impact of the Directive is not defined in terms of situations with a privacy impact, but 
rather to acts of personal data processing. The Directive’s approach is based strongly on a 
fundamental rights interpretation of data protection, where personal data is deemed inher-
ently worthy of protection. 
However, the notion of personal data is extremely broad and subject to much debate. Some 
argue that any data that could be linked to a specific individual should be considered as 
personal data. Under this absolute interpretation, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are per-
sonal data, regardless of whether the entity processing them has a realistic possibility of 
linking them to a given individual. Freely chosen user names, even those that contain no 
semantic link to a user, and geographical information are also problematic. Data such as 
those in Google Street view may come under the Directive if they include images of indi-
viduals. 
Anonymity in large datasets is also complicated. Healthcare research is one area that uses 
large sets of anonymized clinical data for statistical analysis, data mining etc. However, 
regardless of how rigorously the data is de-personalized, legally speaking under this abso-
lute interpretation it remains personal data if there is a possibility of linking the data to an 
individual, however remote, difficult or complex that may be. 
Determining what constitutes personal data becomes particularly acute in the context of 
mobile telecommunications, where a device with an IP address may easily be used by an-
other entity. The problem is likely to get worse with IPv6, when IP addresses will become 
much more widely available and begin to be assigned to objects such as home appliances or 
cars. 
While the relative interpretation is more flexible than the absolute one, the three criteria are 
still very broad. For instance, a website that uses IP addresses to determine the likely origin 
of a visitor for language customization purposes clearly uses information “to determine the 
treatment of a specific person” and “to have an impact on a specific person”. Thus, data 
protection rules would apply, regardless of the apparent lack of privacy risk. 
The Directive’s rules on special categories of processing could also benefit from reconsid-
eration. As it stands, the Directive acknowledges that certain types of personal data are 
more privacy sensitive and more likely to harm the data subject in cases of unauthorized 
 16
processing. These include personal data “revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opin-
ions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life” (Article 8 paragraph 1 of the Directive). Based on this, more 
stringent conditions for the processing of such categories are imposed. 
In addition, the special categories contain some surprising omissions, for instance financial 
and location data. The interpretation of location data (e.g. which locations are visited, sug-
gesting which shops are frequented, and which products and services are bought), may in 
the future permit the identification of the health, social, sexual or religious characteristics 
of the data subject. Location based services provided via mobile devices are already seen as 
a growth market. This is an example of one aspect (protection of special categories of data 
processing) where the Directive appears to have favored a process oriented approach fo-
cused on linking specific obligations to formal criteria, rather than on an outcomes based 
approach that would consider the impact and the necessity of such obligations."32 
 
 
Measures aimed at providing transparency through better information and notification are 
inconsistent and ineffective 
"One of the goals of the Directive is to make data processing more transparent to data sub-
jects. In order to achieve this goal, data controllers are required to provide certain infor-
mation to the data subject, and in some cases to register a notification with the national data 
protection authority. 
The information obligation is contained in Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive, which dis-
tinguish between situations where the data is directly (Article 10) or indirectly (Article 11) 
obtained from the data subject. In both cases, there is a list of information that must be pro-
vided to the data subject. 
                                                 
 
32
 Neil Robinson, Hans Graux, Maarten Botterman, Lorenzo Valeri. Review of the European Data Protection 
Directive. May 2009, p. 27-28 
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The main way of providing this information is via a privacy notices, privacy policies or 
consent notices. While there is no strict definition of these types of documents, notices can 
be considered to be accessible texts aiming to inform the average data subject; policies con-
tain specific legal information delineating data subjects’ rights and data controller’s obliga-
tions; and consent notices are aimed at obtaining the data subject’s informed (in principle) 
consent for certain data processing activities, e.g. by ticking a box. Ultimately, these texts 
should provide consumers with the information needed to exercise their rights, and become 
a factor in how they value offerings. 
More importantly, while privacy policies are considered to be the main way of obtaining 
consent from a data subject in the online world, consumers feel very strongly that current 
mechanisms do not help them to understand their rights.33 The evidence suggests that their 
use is predominantly targeted to meet any applicable legal transparency requirement, rather 
than serving a real transparency benefit towards the consumer. Privacy policies are written 
by lawyers, for lawyers, and appear to serve little useful purpose for the data subject due to 
their length, complexity and extensive use of legal terminology. 
Privacy policies may also differ significantly from one Member State to another. In some 
countries, for example, each privacy policy must state the relevant applicable decree, 
whereas in others the relevant law does not need to be referenced. Due to the pressures of 
efficiency and speed, service providers may opt to draft one privacy policy that is compati-
ble with the most stringent legislative requirements in the hopes that this will cover the 
requirements of other Member States. Interviewees also mentioned that legal requirements 
for consent in certain countries were so restrictive that companies were dissuaded from 
investing in those countries. 
Recent comments from the Article 29 Working Party on improving the accessibility of pri-
vacy policies by making them easier to understand were regarded as somewhat naive by 
those in the commercial sector, and contradictory. This is because some national laws re-
                                                 
 
33
 E.g. see Scribbins, K., Privacy@net – an International Comparative Study of consumer privacy on the 
internet Consumers International - Programme for Developed Economies and Economies in Transition; 2001 
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quire full descriptions of data processing activities, and it is very difficult to describe them 
in a form the consumer can understand. 
In addition, privacy policies have hidden costs. A recent experimental economic study of 
US privacy policies illustrates the potential economic damage that would result were con-
sumers to read each policy. The cost to the US national economy just for reading each pri-
vacy policy was estimated to be $365bn, based on the length of time it takes to read a pri-
vacy policy and the monetary value of that time. 
The end result is that privacy policies are not read. Companies have evidence indicating 
that few consumers access privacy policies. This does not necessarily demonstrate lack of 
interest – users notified about new privacy policies often ask questions. Surveys by 
Eurobarometer34 and the social networking site Facebook35 indicate that privacy awareness 
does exist, but that users do not view the privacy policy as a means of expressing their con-
sent with its contents. An understanding that consent has already been implicitly given by 
accessing the service may help to explain this."36 
 
 
The rules on data export and transfer to external third countries are outmoded 
"One of the best known provisions of the Directive relates to the transfer of personal data to 
third countries. The Directive imposes restrictions on such data transfers to prevent person-
al data from being moved to countries where the data protection regime is less stringent. 
Although the provision seeks to protect the data of European citizens, the sheer quantities 
of personal information transferred overseas may undermine this. It remains to be seen 
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whether European citizens whose data is used and moved around by entities governed by 
legal frameworks outside the EU have the same level of protection. 
The general rule presented by the Directive states that such transfers are only allowed if the 
third country ensures “an adequate level of protection”, the adequacy rule. If this is not the 
case, certain alternative paths are available, such as the consent of the data subject, or the 
adoption of certain standard clauses or BCRs. 
The system for assessing third counties was considered ineffective and too limited. After 
13 years, only 5 non-EU countries have been found to have adequate legal frameworks: 
Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man.37 Current and 
emerging trade powers such as China, India, Brazil, Japan and Russia, are not included, and 
the US is only covered through the ‘Safe Harbor’ Privacy Principles (and to a lesser extent 
the transfer of PNR data to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection). 
Interviewees considered that adequacy assessments as currently conducted were merely a 
review of paper and policy, rather than a serious investigation into how personal data is In 
addition, the adequacy rule was considered to be inappropriately focused. When determin-
ing whether the personal data of a specific subject is sufficiently protected in a third coun-
try, it is important to know that: (a) the data controller has taken sufficient measures to 
achieve this objective; and (b) the data controller can be held accountable for any incidents. 
The presence of an adequate legal framework that appears to match the provisions of the 
Directive in the third country does not address this problem fully. It was suggested by some 
interviewees that harmonization with third countries (those outside the EU) would automat-
ically lead to a worse level of protection. 
Assigning rights to data subjects was also seen as an issue. The example of a non-European 
company that wished to establish a data processing centre within Europe was cited. While 
this move is positive from an economic perspective, from a data controller’s perspective it 
is confusing. Non-European citizens whose data is processed in Europe will be assigned 
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rights that they do not ordinarily have, creating uncertainty as to which legal framework 
takes primacy."38 
 
 
The tools providing for transfer of data to third countries are cumbersome 
"Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the alternative mechanisms, in particular 
BCRs and Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), were perceived as a much more positive 
approach to transfers to third countries. Essentially, these allow (or rather require) data con-
trollers to assume direct responsibility for ensuring the security of the transfer and any oth-
er related data transfer. 
However, even a contractual approach to data transfer leaves certain issues to be resolved. 
Most notably, data controllers commented that the processes for accepting standard clauses 
still varied from Member State to Member State, wasting considerable time for all in-
volved. A clear call was made to: (a) harmonize the procedures for approving contractual 
clauses, and (b) make mutual acceptance mandatory, so that approval by the DPA in one 
Member State would make further steps in other Member States unnecessary. This would 
allow DPAs to make better use of their limited resources, instead of having to conduct an 
almost identical checking process across each Member State. 
BCRs have come under some scrutiny due to the recent initiative whereby they are mutual-
ly accepted among a sub-group of sixteen Member States. Under this initiative, a BCR that 
is prepared, submitted and approved in one jurisdiction is considered as adequate in the 
other countries in the group. This ‘passporting’ of BCRs is regarded as counter-productive, 
since the regulators review them more stringently than SCCs because, if approved, they 
will be valid in several countries. However, one interviewee criticized the delay in mutually 
recognizing BCRs, arguing that this should have happened sooner. The lack of a clear 
framework under the Directive for facilitating this process was sometimes interpreted as a 
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shortcoming within the Directive that placed too much importance on adequacy assess-
ments over more pragmatic solutions. 
BCRs were also criticized for being largely only useful for Human Resources data, which 
is structured sufficiently similarly across organizations so as to be internally consistent and 
hence suitable for transfer. 
The practical application of BCRs has yet to be tested, since a very limited number of data 
controllers have attempted to implement them. Lack of harmonization was considered to be 
the major factor behind the uneven effectiveness of these tools."39 
 
 
The role of DPAs in accountability and enforcement is inconsistent 
"Enforcing the Directive can be difficult because the damages suffered are often intangible 
(or sometimes not evident in the short term), it is difficult to assign a value to any damages, 
and determining responsibilities is complex. 
The provisions for remedies and liability in the Directive are quite broad, and in principle 
allow data subjects ample opportunity to obtain compensation for damages. However, this 
approach does not function in practice for a number of reasons, including: 
• There may not be any immediate damages, such as when confidential data, e.g. 
credit card numbers, are leaked. As long as the data has not yet been abused, it may be 
difficult to obtain any compensation, even if negligence on the data controller’s part 
has created a substantial security and privacy risk. 
• The extent of damages may be difficult to quantify. To continue the example above: 
suppose a credit card is abused, but the bank rectifies the problem by refunding the in-
jured party and by issuing a new card. The data subject must still obtain a new card, 
cancel any payments linked to the old number, notify service providers of changed 
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payment info etc. Clearly, this loss of time and effort has a cost, but how can it be cal-
culated fairly? 
• Damages are typically too small to bother with on an individual scale. If 20,000 
credit cards must be revoked because a data controller has been careless, 20,000 indi-
viduals will have to go through the aforementioned steps. The collective damage is 
clearly substantial, but it is quite unlikely that any of the individuals involved will un-
dertake any action, since any compensation is likely to be dwarfed by the extra effort 
and expenditure required to obtain it. The risk of sanctions for the data controller re-
sponsible for such an incident therefore remains limited."40 
 
The definition of entities involved in processing and managing personal data is simplistic 
and static 
The relationship between processor and data controller envisaged in the Directive does not 
adequately cover all the entities involved in the processing of personal data in a modern 
networked economy. There is uncertainty about when a processor becomes a controller or 
vice versa, particularly in an online environment where the act of visiting a website might 
result in cookies being sent from a number of sources scattered around the globe. 
Trends toward off-shoring, outsourcing, sub-processing and onward transfer have resulted 
in companies having to arrange contractual clauses with each and every sub-contractor in-
volved in processing, in order to avoid being in breach of legislative requirements. The 
bureaucracy involved in reviewing each of the contracts which articulate these relationships 
(which may have to be re-authorized whenever there is even the slightest change) is clearly 
a burden for authorities and controllers.41 
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Other minor weaknesses 
"Firstly, there is concern over a growing dichotomy between data protection in the first 
(internal market) and third pillar (law enforcement and judicial co-operation). While the 
Directive only covers the first pillar, the consensus seemed to be that a common vision on 
data protection was needed across pillars. The possible disappearance of the pillar distinc-
tion in the future is one reason behind this thinking. More importantly, the existence of 
special rules that substantially exempt third pillar activities from data protection principles 
undermines the status of these principles as an important part of the European interpretation 
of fundamental rights. While some concessions certainly need to be made in the light of 
third pillar efforts, the current approach to data protection in the third pillar is seen as being 
too ad hoc and lacking restrictions. While this criticism has been partially addressed 
through the recent Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data pro-
cessed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation,42 this does not resolve the con-
tinuing distinction between first and third pillar data protection rules and practices. The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) recently raised these issues in an opinion on 
the Final Report of the High Level Contact Group on a transatlantic data sharing agree-
ment.43 
Secondly, the Directive expressly encourages codes of conduct that clarify how the provi-
sions of the Directive apply in specific contexts and sectors at both the national and Euro-
pean levels. However, in practice codes of conduct are almost exclusively adopted at the 
national level, and their popularity varies greatly from country to country. Only two Codes 
of Conduct have been adopted at the EU level, one by IATA, the other by FEDMA. The 
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Commission expressed its disappointment at the lack of EU level codes in its 2003 First 
Implementation Report.44 The interviews for this study gave two main reasons for the lack 
of success with EU-wide codes of conduct. Firstly, DPAs seemed less interested in reach-
ing a consensus on good data protection practices with the sector, and more interested in 
unilaterally imposing their own set of rules. Regardless of whether this is a fair statement 
or not, some data controllers believe that stakeholders and their legitimate interests are not 
adequately taken into account, and felt that their roles and interests were not adequately 
acknowledged in the Directive. Secondly, resources to promote and validate codes of con-
duct were considered insufficient, both within certain DPAs and at the European level. This 
may be due to a lack of resources or due to different priorities. 
Finally, there is the question of the use of technology to achieve objectives. A positive as-
pect of the Directive was the fact that it does not specify particular technologies, but inter-
viewees commented that technology could be used to help companies and individuals exer-
cise the rights articulated in the Directive. It was felt that Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs) have not been widely taken up, for various reasons. Some respondents commented 
that use of PETs has been restricted because of the focus on anonymisation technologies 
rather than a broader definition encompassing pseudonymisation. A vicious circle appears 
to prevent PET uptake. Companies feel no need to deploy PETs because the regulator does 
not require their implementation. The regulator does not require PETs because they see no 
market for suppliers of such technology. Suppliers do not develop PET products because 
companies are not required to deploy them. The regulators thus know that a viable market 
for such technology to help compliance does not exist, so they may treat data controllers 
less harshly for not implementing such technology."45 
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CHAPTER II   ̶ ̶ ̶̶ PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN GEORGIA 
2.1 Introduction 
Until 2011 there was little specific privacy law in Georgia. As the country had not enacted 
the lex specialis legislation on data protection, the issue was mainly dealt in general man-
ner. The Constitution of Georgia refers to the general right of privacy stating that private 
information of the person shall not be accessible without the consent of such person. Like-
wise, the Civil Code of Georgia makes no specific mention of privacy only referring to the 
general notion of non-materials rights of the person and establishing the general right of the 
person to have access to his/her private data. General regulation of data protection is also 
envisaged in General Administrative Code of Georgia. However, the latter is only applica-
ble in vertical relationships and may be invoked only in relations of public law kind. 
Sector-specific approach to data protection matter can be found in exceptional cases and in 
statutes such as the Tax Code of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Commercial Banks, Decree 
of National Commission of Communications of Georgia on Provision of Services and Pro-
tection of Consumers’ Rights in the Sphere of Electronic Communications. However, the 
scope of application of these statutes is very narrow and covers the specific spheres for 
which these regulations have been enacted. As far as the definition of personal data is con-
cerned, only two statutes provide the specification in this respect. According to General 
Administrative Code of Georgia personal data (information) means public in-formation 
allowing identification of a person.46 
As mentioned above, until 2011 there was no particular law and complete legislative base 
on Personal Data Protection in Georgia. According to the European Neighborhood Policy 
Action Plan Georgia was responsible for implementation of Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Therefore it was very 
necessary to adopt a specific law concerning this issue and make some important changes 
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within the existing various laws in order to perform the processing, transferring, saving and 
protection of Personal Data according to the international standards. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection 
2.2.1 Overview  
On December 28, 2011 the Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Personal Data Pro-
tection. The main part of the law was passed on May 1, 2012, while its Chapter 7 adminis-
trative liability for violation of the law was enacted since January 1, 2013. As far as the 
private sector is concerned, individual articles will enter into force from January 1, 2016. 
The Law aims to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to 
privacy in relation to processing personal data. 
It is worth mentioning that this law is an important part of the on-going drive to open up 
public bodies to greater scrutiny, which would result in enhanced openness and transparen-
cy in public life. Equally important, an effective data protection law would also contribute 
to the regime of protection for the right to information by granting individuals the right to 
demand to be told what information is held on them by both public and private bodies. 
The Law protects individuals’ privacy in the processing of personal data by defining a 
number of "general principles of personal data processing", such as that personal data shall 
be processed lawfully and fairly, and that only relevant and accurate data shall be pro-
cessed. The "data subject" is given a number of rights, including, in principle, a right to be 
informed that data about him/her is being processed and a right to access that data. The 
Law applies to data processing by any person, legal entity or administrative organ, subject 
to the operation of the Law on State Secrets, as well as to general exceptions for data held 
in relation to criminal investigations or prosecutions. Although the "data protection princi-
ples" outlined in the international treaties find some recognition in the Law, there are a 
number of important oversights. In particular, the exceptions relating to State secrets and 
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data processing in the context of criminal investigations and proceedings would limit sig-
nificantly the operational scope of the law. At the same time, an exception should be added 
to ensure that the media are not unduly fettered in their work by the data access provi-
sions.47 
Article 3 of the Law provides that the law applies to "the processing of data wholly or part-
ly by automatic means, as well as to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of 
data which form part of a filing system or are processed to form part of a filing system." 48 
The same article (3) establishes some exceptions to this general principle: 
1. "processing of data by a natural person for purely personal purposes, when the pro-
cessing is not connected with his/her commercial or professional activities;  
2. processing of data for case management purposes at the court;  
3. processing of information which is considered state secret;  
4. processing of data for the purposes of public and state security (including economic se-
curity), defense, operative-investigative activities and criminal investigation."49 
The first exception, relating to data processing for personal purposes, is uncontroversial. 
Exceptions such as this are found in all data protection laws and have the aim of exempting 
people’s personal address books, for example, from being subject to data protection law. 
The other exceptions, however, are more problematic. They are framed as class exceptions, 
meaning that the Law will not apply to any data that falls in one of the relevant categories. 
No harm test is required and there is no provision for a public interest override. 
With regard to the second and forth exception, protecting data processed in relation to 
criminal investigations, this would allow police or judicial authorities to shield serious 
wrong-doing within their departments. This is contrary not only to international standards, 
inasmuch as it fails to incorporate a harm test or public interest override. It also appears, on 
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its face, to be contrary to the right to access personal information under Article 41 of the 
Constitution, which allows only for non-disclosure of "information containing state, profes-
sional or commercial secrets".50 
The third exception effectively subjects the operation of the Law to the 1996 Law on State 
Secrets.51 This Law defines as a "state secret", "a kind of information that includes data 
containing a state secret in the areas of defense, economy, external relations, intelligence 
service, state security and protection of law and order disclosure or loss of which may in-
flict harm on the sovereignty, constitutional framework or political and economic interests 
of Georgia."52 An exception is provided that restricts the classification as "secret" of any 
information that "may prejudice or restrict basic human rights and freedoms or may cause 
harm to health and safety of population"53 as well as information falling within one of the 
following categories: 
a) information on natural disasters, catastrophes and other "extraordinary events" which 
have already occurred or may occur and which threaten the safety of citizens; 
b) information on environmental conditions, health and living standards of the population, 
including information on medical services and social security, as well as social-
demographic data and data on educational and cultural levels of the population. 
c) information on corruption, unlawful action by officials and crime statistics; 
d) information on privileges, compensations and benefits provided by the exception to citi-
zens, officials, enterprises, institutions and organizations; 
e) information on the exception monetary fund and national gold reserve; and 
f) information relating to the health of "top officials of the state power".54 
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The regime established under the 1996 Law on State Secrets is problematic primarily be-
cause of the extremely broad range of material caught by the definition of "state secret". 
Despite the public interest exemptions provided in Article 8, the formulation as exception 
secret of any material relating to, for example, the economic situation of the country whose 
disclosure "may" cause harm would capture a wide range of materials, and is contrary to 
international standard according to which disclosure may be refused only where there is a 
serious likelihood of real harm and the overall public interest is served by non-disclosure. 
By subjecting the Law on Personal Data to the Law on State Secrets, an unnecessarily 
broad range of material has been withdrawn from the scope of the Law.55 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Main Strengths 
We currently enjoy de facto no protection of our private data in Georgia. Companies spam 
people with unsolicited advertising SMS and the Ministry of Interior continues to carry out 
systematic real-time surveillance of all electronic communication without sufficient court 
oversight. If you believe that your personal data is collected, stored and used in a way that 
is violating the law, there is a new authority that will soon be able to help you to address 
your privacy complaints and investigate your case – the Personal Data Protection Inspec-
tor’s office.56 
According to the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection, the new institute, Personal 
Data Protection Inspector shall be introduced. The Inspector shall carry out control on the 
lawfulness of data processing. Data Protection Inspector is appointed on the basis of an 
open competition. The Competition Commission is approved by the Prime Minister of 
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Georgia. The Commission consists of representatives from the government of Georgia, the 
Parliament, Judiciary and Public Defender’s Office, as well as NGO representatives. The 
Competition Commission shall select personal data protection inspector by the majority 
votes and submit him/her to the Prime Minister for approval. The Prime Minister appoints 
an inspector within 10 days term, or he announces a competition again.57 
Personal Data Protection Inspector’s office should obviously be considered as a positive 
novelty and main strengths of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection of Georgia. 
The Law on Personal Data Protection defines the Inspector’s role in monitoring and enforc-
ing of this law. 
The job description of the Inspector includes: 
• Providing instructions to the public and the private sector about how to ensure ade-
quate protection of personal data; 
• Reviewing data-related complaints and appeals; 
• Inspecting public and private entities to ensure that the data processing is carried 
out in compliance with the law; 
• Raising public awareness on the protection of personal data. 
Among other powers, the Inspector will eventually be able to order 
• that violations during the collection, processing and storage of data are corrected; 
• that data that was collected or processed in violation of the law is secured, 
anonymized, removed or destroyed;   
• a temporary or permanent stop on the processing of data if the handler of the data 
fails to comply with the law. 
If the Inspector detects administrative offenses, she is empowered (from 2016 on) to im-
pose sanctions on violators; the decisions are binding and can be appealed in court. 
Every year, the Inspector has to issue a public annual report on the state of data protection 
that documents significant violations and issues recommendations for improvements. The 
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Inspector is entitled to submit proposals to Parliament and government institutions to im-
prove the legal framework regarding data protection. 
In line with conflict of interest rules, the Inspector cannot be an employee of another gov-
ernment body or carry out any other paid activity, with the exception of scientific, educa-
tional or artistic activities and must not be a member of a political party or engage in politi-
cal activities.58 
It is worth to mention that public knowledge about privacy and data protection is very low 
in Georgia. Most people are not fully aware that every time they go online, write an email, 
post a status or check-in on Facebook, Tweet their thoughts, use a chip card in a supermar-
ket or simply send a SMS or go somewhere with their mobile phone turned on, they create 
a track of vast amount of information on who they are, where they are, what they purchase 
and where they are likely go. Analyzing all this data, which today is often referred as "new 
oil" and the "new currency of the digital world", gives governments, companies – anyone 
with access to it – the ability to analyze, understand and even predict humans’ actions. This 
basic premise of personal data in the digital world makes it both an asset for positive de-
velopments as well as a potential object for misuse. The Inspector and her team will hope-
fully become a prominent and trusted institution that will not only promote an environment 
where both, state and private entities respect individuals’ privacy rights, but also manage to 
increase citizens’ awareness of this right.59 
Personal data protection inspector plays a decisive role in implementation of the Law, es-
pecially when there is no experience of application of the Law and the inspector has to pre-
pare number of different guiding recommendations. In spite of legislative obligations, the 
state has done nothing in that direction so far, and the inspector’s position is vacant.60 
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2.2.3 Main Weaknesses 
The regulation of personal data protection is indeed a requisite for democratic society, but 
the law fails to meet this objective and creates the danger of violating private life. Particu-
larly, paragraph B of the Article 6, which envisages processing data of special category (the 
so-called sensitive data) without the consent of the data subject when the "public interest" 
is at stake. The data of special category is defined as follows: "personal data associated 
with the individual’s racial or ethnic background, political views, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, membership of a professional organization, state of health, sex life, criminal history 
and biometrical data that can identify the above mentioned characteristics."  
The corresponding provision does not fully comply with the Georgian Constitution.  The 
Constitution already draws out the concrete public interests that can give rise to the dissem-
ination of sensitive information. Specifically, paragraph II of the Article 41, states that in 
order to restrict a fundamental human right, one of the following goals must be met: "when 
it is necessary for ensuring the state security or public safety, for the protection of health, 
rights and freedoms of others." 
Lasha Tordia (one of the initiators of the law) defined the idea of "public interest" in an 
interview with Netgazeti: "a kindergarten or a health unit must have information on wheth-
er its employee has AIDs or a kindergarten must know about the sexual orientation of its 
employee." "We are talking about protecting such information. This data must be used for 
concrete purposes and cannot be used dishonestly," – he added. 
Yet the law creates a possibility of releasing sensitive information for the aim of undefined 
public interest thus a high risk for dishonest usage. Ucha Nanuashvili, the head of the Hu-
man Rights Center (Georgia) states: "Government creates additional mechanisms for exer-
cising pressure on its citizens. In particular, the law envisages processing data of people’s 
political and ideological views, ethnic and religious backgrounds and their sexual orienta-
tion. This has been the grounds for persecution of political opponents numerous times be-
fore and there is no guarantee that this data will not be used dishonestly. An employer 
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might not hire a person due to his illness, sexual orientation or political views and since this 
is not public an appeal cannot be made in any instance."61 
After adopting the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection several non-governmental 
organizations submitted their critical reviews of the above-mentioned law. One of them 
was Georgian Young Lawyers' Association which presented their conclusion recognizing 
that adopting the specific law on Personal Data Protection is obviously a one step ahead 
relating to solving some legislative problems, but still it’s not perfect enough to leave un-
touched. Even, some articles of the law should be evaluated as regressive. In particular: 
• Georgian General Administrative Code establishes higher standards regarding per-
sonal data protection by public sector, than presented law. For example, according to the 
Article 9 of the law public institution is allowed to process and transfer the data regarding 
sex life, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs and state of health of the data 
subject without his/her consent. Whereas General Administrative Code fully prohibits the 
collection, saving, processing or transferring such kind of data which is related to racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, state of health, sex life 
or conviction of a person. We think the law should by no means allow the weakening of 
existing regulations and putting privacy in danger; 
• The law establishes the price for giving out one and the same personal data to the 
person twice a year. But there is no definition of the price –it is the price for making a copy 
of the data or the data becomes requiring payment; 
• Law foresees the data subject’s right to appeal in case data processor refuses to rec-
tify, update, add, block, erase and destroy the data. Data subject has the right to appeal the 
decision of the data processor to the higher administrative organ, personal data protection 
inspector or the court. The provided mechanism of appeal is quite vague. In particular, it is 
unclear whether it is established three-step mechanism of appeal or they are just alterna-
tives. The law should be more specific regarding this issue. 
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• It is also unclear what kind of final decision is made by personal data protection in-
spector and how strong is its legal power. In order to make personal data inspector’s insti-
tution more effective it is necessary to give the obligatory character to his/her decisions. 
All in all, we assume that provided version of the law is not strong enough and without 
making any serious changes it won’t be able to fully protect people’s privacy and ensure 
achieving its goals.62 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Constitution and other laws 
As we discussed above before 2011 there was no specific law regulating personal data pro-
cessing and privacy in Georgia. Instead, there were and still are various kinds of laws 
thanks to which personal data protection and privacy issues were solved. In other words, 
before adopting the Law of Georgia on personal Data Protection all laws referring to the 
personal data protection were scattered and there was no complete and well-organized leg-
islative base. In this paragraph we will name and discuss all these laws. 
Constitution of Georgia 
According to the Article 20 of Constitution of Georgia "everyone’s private life, place of 
personal activity, personal records, correspondence, communication by telephone or other 
technical means, as well as messages received through technical means shall be inviolable." 
From this passage it is clear that people’s privacy is protected by the supreme law, but the 
main problem is that it refers to the issue in a general manner. Although the Constitution 
foresees some exception from this general rule, in particular "restriction of the aforemen-
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tioned rights shall be permissible by a court decision or also without such decision in the 
case of the urgent necessity provided for by law." 
The most important part of the Constitution regarding privacy and personal data protection 
is Article 41 which explicitly states that all kind of personal data ("other private matters") is 
protected by law – "The information existing on official papers pertaining to individual’s 
health, his/her finances or other private matters, shall not be accessible to anyone without 
the consent of the individual in question except in the cases determined by law, when it is 
necessary for ensuring the state security or public safety, for the protection of health, rights 
and freedoms of others." 
Civil Code of Georgia 
Civil Code of Georgia states that every person has the right to become familiar with the 
existing personal data about him/her which is related to his/her financial condition or other 
private matters and receive the copies of this data. Also, it is prohibited to refuse the trans-
ferring of the data which includes the information about him/her. It is worth to mention that 
the Civil Code of Georgia explicitly states that in order to process the personal data lawful-
ly, written consent of that person is required.63 
General Administrative Code of Georgia 
The General Administrative Code of Georgia regulates personal data protection and priva-
cy issues in relation to administrative agencies and ensures the lawfulness of their actions. 
The Code provides the definition of "Personal Data" according to which personal data is a 
public information, which allows the identification of the person. Also, it states that per-
sonal data can be considered as a private secret and it may be done so only by the person 
about whom this information exists. According to the Code the private secret is inviolable 
until the death of the person.64 
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According to the Article 43 (a) of the General Administrative Code of Georgia a public 
agency is allowed to "collect, process and store only those data that are expressly provided 
by law and are necessary for the proper functioning of the agency." Also, a public agency is 
not allowed to collect, process, save or transfer the personal data relating to person’s reli-
gious, sexual or ethnical identity, political or philosophical beliefs. Except this, a public 
agency is supposed to notify immediately a concerned person at his current address of the 
claim of his personal data by a third person or a public agency.65 
Article 43 also contains obligation of the public agency, in particular: 
"Public agency shall 
• before transferring personal data to another person/public agency take all reasona-
ble measures for double-checking whether those data are accurate, relevant, updated 
and complete; 
• during the collection, processing and storage of personal data inform a concerned 
person about the objectives and legal grounds for processing personal data, whether 
the person is required to provide personal information, the sources and composition 
of personal information and third persons who may gain access to it."66 
As we have seen above Georgian legislation on personal data protection and privacy was 
consisted of above-mentioned declarative laws that made privacy related issues vague and 
difficult to solve. 
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CHAPTER III   ̶ COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Protection of Personal Data is among EU top priorities and key paragraphs of the European 
Neighborhood Policy Georgia – EU action plan. The Law of Georgia "on Personal Data 
Protection" was based on the legislation of the European Union and its member states. 
Consequently, for determining and analyzing current standards we should review all the 
differences and similarities that are between EU Directive and Law of Georgia on Personal 
Data Protection. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Differences and Similarities 
Principles of the processing of data 
Article 4 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection and Article 6 of the EU Di-
rective provide quite similar general principles for the processing of personal data: 
• data should be processed fairly and lawfully; 
• data should be collected only if there is a explicit and legitimate purposes; 
• data should be adequate and not excessive in relation to those purposes; 
• data should be valid and accurate; 
• data should be kept only for as long as it is necessary for the processing of data 
purposes; 
 
 
 
Grounds for the processing of data 
According to the Article 5 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection and Article 7 
of the EU Directive there are following criteria making data processing legitimate: 
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• data subject has given his/her consent; 
• processing of data is envisaged by the law;  
• processing of data is necessary for compliance with the obligations, compelled by 
the legislation, to which a data processor is subject;  
• processing of data is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of a data sub-
ject;  
• processing of data is necessary for the protection of legitimate interests of a data 
processor or a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the advanced 
interest of the protection of rights and freedoms of a data subject;  
• processing of data is necessary for the protection of an important public interest, in 
accordance with the law; 
As we see the grounds are exactly the same, only there are few differences. Article 5 of the 
Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection states two more grounds that can make data 
processing legitimate. For example: 
• according to the law, data are publicly accessible or a data subject has made them 
publicly accessible;  
• processing of data is necessary for the consideration of an application of a data 
subject (for providing service to him/her). 
Also it is worth to mention that the EU Directive is more specific and careful regarding the 
consent of the data subject and requires it (consent) to be "unambiguously given" while the 
Law of Georgia doesn’t provide this kind of requirement. One can argue that this may 
cause misunderstanding while interpreting the law or make it difficult to know what kind of 
act can be considered as "consent". 
When it comes to processing of special categories of data we should say that Georgian law 
fully corresponds with the EU Directive, stating that processing of special category of data 
should be prohibited. The definition of "special category of data" is provided in the Article 
2(b) – data relating to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
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beliefs, trade-union membership, state of health, sex life or conviction of a person, as well 
as biometric data which allow for a person’s identification through the above-mentioned 
factors;  
The exceptions are also the same in both legislations. The prohibition doesn’t apply if: 
• data subject has given written consent to the processing of special category of da-
ta; 
• processing of data is necessary for carrying out the employment obligations or en-
joying the related rights by a data processor; 
• processing of data is necessary for the protection of vital interests of a data subject 
or a third person and a data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his/her 
consent to the processing of data; 
• data are processed for the purposes of the protection of public health, for the pro-
tection of a natural person’s health by a medical institution (employee), also if this is 
necessary for the management or functioning of healthcare system; 
The difference is that the Article 6 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection pro-
vides one more ground for processing of special categories of data: 
• data subject has made the data regarding him/her public, without explicit prohibi-
tion of their usage; 
 
 
 
Post-Mortem Privacy 
According to the EU Directive the issue of what happens to the deceased’s data and indi-
viduals’ privacy post-mortem is far from clear and settled from a legal and regulatory per-
spective. Currently, most of the data protection regimes do not include protection of dece-
dents’ personal data and they do not legally recognize this aspect of "post-mortem privacy". 
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Therefore, the question arises as to whether personal data should be protected both in life 
and upon death.67 
In contrast to EU Directive the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection is quite clear 
about this issue. In particular, the Article 7 states: 
• After the death of a data subject, the processing of data regarding him/her shall be 
allowed with the consent of a data subject's parent, child, grandchild or a spouse, or if 
30 years have elapsed since the death of a data subject, except for the grounds envis-
aged by Articles 5 and 6 of this Law.  
• After the death of a data subject, the processing of data regarding him/her shall al-
so be allowed, if it is necessary for realization of the rights to inheritance.  
• The processing of data on the grounds envisaged by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Ar-
ticle shall be prohibited, if a data subject has expressed in writing the will on the pro-
hibition of the processing of data regarding him/her after death, except for the pro-
cessing on the grounds envisaged by Articles 5 and 6 of this Law.  
• For the processing of a deceased person’s name, sex, dates of birth and death, 
presence of the ground for the processing of data envisaged by this Law shall be not 
required.  
• The data on a deceased person can be disclosed for the historical, statistical and 
research purposes, except for the cases when a deceased person prohibited their dis-
closure in writing.  
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Video surveillance 
In contrast to Law of Georgia on Personal Data protection the EU Directive doesn’t explic-
itly mention anything about video surveillance, but it doesn’t mean that this issue isn’t reg-
ulated. There are some general statements and requirements by which the aforementioned 
issue can be solved. 
Directive is not applicable in matters of "public security" and if the data are not processed 
in files. 
• So surveillance by the police cannot be judged by the Directive. On the other 
hand, technical surveillance by private bodies is completely regulated by the Di-
rective, even if an enterprise is working in security.  
• A simple conventional camera-monitor-system might not be a matter of the Di-
rective, but the storage of digital pictures does. 
Which are the regulations of the Directive that restrict Video surveillance? 
Article 10 regulates the "notice". The affected person must be given information about: 
• the identity of the person in charge for the processing; 
• the identity of the processing body; 
• the purpose of the processing; 
• information on further recipients and 
• the rights of the affected. 
In addition Article 12 guarantees detailed information on the storage and the logical struc-
ture of the automatic processing. 
There might be practical problems to realize the right to object (of Art. 14) in video surveil-
lance, because the data collection happens automatically without any possibility of the af-
fected to intervene in this process. 
According to Article 15 nobody shall be subject to a considerably affecting decision made 
exclusively on the basis of automated data processing. This regulation is relevant, if bio-
metrical methods of identification are used. The use of automated face recognition systems 
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in public areas, which can have an immense impact on the affected person, lies in conflict 
with this regulation. 
Finally we have to mention Article 20 and 21 of the Directive: Undoubtedly video surveil-
lance includes specific risks for rights and liberties. So this method has to be subject of a 
prior checking. Moreover the controller must make available (on demand) to everyone in-
formation about: 
• the person in charge, 
• the purpose, 
• description of the categories of those affected, 
• the data recipients, 
• general description of the measures taken to guarantee the data security.68 
The Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection is more specific regarding this issue and 
contains several articles (Article 12, 13, 14) regulating the video surveillance of the streets 
and buildings (including residential ones). The Law provides some general principles 
which make video surveillance lawful, for example: 
• Conducting video surveillance in the streets shall be allowed only for the purposes 
of crime prevention, as well as for the security of persons and protection of property, 
public order and the protection of minors from negative influence; 
• In case of installing a video surveillance system, public and private institutions 
shall be obliged to post a relevant warning sign in a visible place. In this case a data 
subject shall be considered to be informed on the processing of data regarding him; 
• Only outdoor perimeter and entrance of a building can be monitored by a video 
surveillance system; 
                                                 
 
68
 Dr. Thilo Weichert. Public Video Surveillance in View of the European Privacy Protection Directive and 
German Privacy Protection Law. February 22 to 24, 2000. 
Available at: https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/video/vidsur_e.htm  
 43
• Conducting video surveillance in dressing rooms and the places of hygiene shall 
be prohibited; 
• Installation of a video surveillance system in a residential building shall require a 
written consent of more than a half of the owners of this building; 
• Installation of a video surveillance system in a residential building shall be al-
lowed only for the security purposes of persons and property; 
• Only the entrance and common space can be monitored by a video surveillance 
system, installed in a residential building. Monitoring of the apartments of owners 
shall be prohibited; 
 
 
 
Data security 
The obligation of ensuring the adequate security and protection of the data while pro-
cessing is provided in the Article 17 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection and 
in the Article 16-17 of the EU Directive. In particular, data processor is "obliged to apply 
the organizational and technical measures, which ensure the protection of data against acci-
dental or unlawful destruction, alteration, disclosure, access, or any other form of unlawful 
use and accidental or unlawful loss."69 
Also, the Article 17 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection contains some gen-
eral principles according to which the data processing should be carried out: 
• A data processor should ensure the registration of all actions performed on elec-
tronic data; 
• The measures applied for data security shall be adequate to the risks related to the 
processing of data; 
• The scope of power shouldn’t be exceeded while processing of data; 
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• The measures on the protection of data security shall be defined by the Georgian 
legislation.  
 
 
 
Rights of a Data Subject 
According to the Article 21 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection the rights of 
a data subject are exactly the same as they are according to the EU Directive. The law of 
Georgia foresees a data subject’s right to request information from a data processor on the 
processing of data regarding him/her. A data processor should provide the following infor-
mation to a data subject: 
• which information regarding him/her is being processed;  
• purpose of the processing of data;  
• legitimate grounds for the processing of data;  
• ways of collecting data;  
• persons to whom the data regarding him/her ware issued, the grounds and purpos-
es of issuance. 
Also, every person have the right to check the personal data regarding him/her, stored in a 
public institution, and obtain the copies of these data free of charge, except for the data 
issuance of which requires fees in accordance with the Georgian legislation. 70 
The article 22 foresees the right of a data subject to request rectification, update, addition, 
blocking, erasure and destruction of data. 
Like EU Directive the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection also provides some 
exemptions and restrictions from the abovementioned rights of a data subject. Exceptions 
are the same, in particular: 
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• national security or defense interests of the country;  
• public security interests;  
• detection, investigation and prevention of crime;  
• important financial or economic interests of the country (including monetary, 
budgetary and taxation matters);  
• rights and freedoms of a data subject and of others.  
 
 
 
Supervisory authority 
The Article 28 of the EU Directive provides the obligation of appointing the supervisory 
authority on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. 
According to this article: "Each Member State shall provide that one or more public author-
ities are responsible for monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions 
adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive. These authorities shall act with 
complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them." 
The institution of Personal Data Protection Inspector can be considered as a direct imple-
mentation of the above-mentioned obligation in Georgian legislation. In the previous chap-
ters we already discussed the main rights and responsibilities of the Personal Data Protec-
tion Inspector, so here we just briefly review some main characteristics of this institution. 
According to the Article 27 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection there are 
following purposes of the activities of the personal data protection inspector: 
• to provide consultations with public and private institutions (persons) on matters 
related to the data protection;  
• to consider applications on the data protection;  
• to examine (to inspect) the lawfulness of the processing of data in public and pri-
vate institutions;  
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• to inform the public about the situation concerning the protection of data and im-
portant developments related thereto in Georgia;  
The personal data protection inspector is appointed through the open competition proce-
dure. The competition commission includes the representatives of the Government of 
Georgia, of the Parliament of Georgia, of the judicial authority, of the Office of the Public 
Defender of Georgia, as well as of the non-governmental sector, on the basis of the princi-
ple of proportionality. This ensures the objectivity and fairness of the procedure of the ap-
pointment.  
The most important thing is the independence of the personal data protection inspector dur-
ing fulfilling his/her responsibilities. The Article 31 of the Law of Georgia on Personal 
Data protection ensures the independence of the inspector by stating that: 
• "In exercising his/her powers an inspector shall be independent and shall not be 
subordinated to any other public official or body. An inspector shall be guided by the 
Constitution of Georgia, international agreements, this Law, other normative acts and 
a statute. Any influence or interference with an inspector’s activities shall be prohib-
ited and punished by the law.  
• For ensuring the independence of an inspector, the state shall be obliged to pro-
vide him/her with appropriate working conditions.  
• An inspector shall have the right not to testify concerning the fact confided to 
him/her as to an inspector. This right shall be preserved to him/her even after the ter-
mination of the term of office." 
The activities of the personal data protection inspector is financed from the state budget of 
Georgia and also he/she (inspector) is authorized to receive grants and contributions in ac-
cordance with the rules established by the Georgian legislation. 
According to the Law of Georgia the inspector is "authorized to conduct an examination of 
any data processor and authorized person, based on his/her own initiative as well as on the 
statement of an interested person." 
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Examination conducted by an inspector implies:  
• establishing of the protection of the principles on the processing of data and of the 
existence of the legitimate grounds for the processing of data;  
• examining the compatibility of the applied procedures and organizational and 
technical measures in accordance with the requirements established by this Law;  
• examining the compliance of the requirements established by this Law concerning 
a catalogue of filing system, register of the catalogues of filing systems and registra-
tion of data issuance;  
• examining the lawfulness of the transmission of data to other states and interna-
tional organizations;  
• examining the compliance with the rules related to the protection of data, estab-
lished by this Law and other normative acts.71 
 
 
 
Transfer of personal data to third countries 
The article 41 of the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection regulates the issue re-
garding the transferring of the personal data to third countries and organizations. The men-
tioned article states that the transfer of the personal data to third countries is allowed if: 
• the grounds for the processing of data envisaged by this Law are present; 
• adequate safeguards for the protection of data are ensured; 
• transfer of data is envisaged by an international agreement of Georgia;  
• data processor provides adequate safeguards for the protection of data and the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of a data subject on the basis of an agreement con-
cluded between a data processor and a respective state, a natural or legal person of 
that state or an international organization.  
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As we have seen above the Georgian legislation implemented all the grounds and general 
principles from the EU Directive that make the transferring of the personal data to third 
countries and organizations legitimate and fully corresponds with EU regulations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The history of personal data protection in Georgia is not that long. As it was noted above, 
before 2011 Georgian legislation on personal data protection was consisted of the 
declarative laws only scattered in various kinds of codes. In 2011 Georgia made an 
important step forward by adopting the Law of Georgia on personal Data Protection which 
is the way more complete and organized legislation base on privacy issues. 
As the review of the Law of Georgia on personal Data Protection showed Georgian 
legislation corresponds with EU Directive quite well. We also discussed the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the above-mentioned law and saw that it’s not perfect enough and 
therefore needs further work. For recommendation purposes we will name some of the 
problematic aspects of the Law of Georgia on personal Data Protection which require more 
attention from the legislators. In particular: 
 Public interest: According to the Law of Georgia on personal Data Protection the 
information (personal data) can be collected without an initial consent if the public 
interest is at stake (Article 6). The problem is that law doesn’t provide any exact def-
inition of "public interest", as a result of it very sensitive personal information can be 
collected and released easily for the aim of undefined public interest, which in its 
turn, creates the possibility of dishonest usage of special category of data. Legislators 
should be more specific and define what the term "public interest" exactly mean and 
this way reduce the bounds of the usage of this article. 
 "Law enforcement: The government should establish a strong oversight mecha-
nism for surveillance and communication data retention by law enforcement bodies. 
This oversight   mechanism should have sufficient resources and enjoy a high level of 
independence from the executive branch of government. The mandate of the new 
personal data inspector and his office, which is currently established based on the 
Law on Personal Data Protection, could be extended to include cases related to crim-
inal investigations, which are exempted from the mandate, as are issues related to na-
tional security. 
 A team of legal experts located in the office of the personal data protection inspec-
tor could receive the mandate to scrutinize any applications, renewals and cancella-
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tions of intrusive surveillance by law enforcement bodies and conduct sampling mon-
itoring of how surveillance is implemented in practice. 
 By law, the use of intercepts is subject to authorization by a judge. However, 
judges are typically not informed in depth about the subject matter of the investi-
gation and are not told the results of the surveillance. In the past, judges have rub-
ber-stamped prosecutors' applications for surveillance and communication inter-
ception. It is not clear to what extent this is still the practice. 
 A lack of court oversight and a weak culture of accountability of law enforce-
ment and intelligence bodies create a strong risk that direct access to communica-
tion data is abused and that journalists, civil society activists, politicians or members 
of the business community against have their movement and communication 
monitored. 
 Intelligence: Parliament should establish appropriate oversight over the work of 
intelligence services and establish a new culture of accountability. A parliamentary 
commission could take on the role of monitoring of the general conduct of intelli-
gence agencies, including their use of surveillance and wiretapping. 
 Data collection: Ministry of Internal Affairs uses and maintains "Black Boxes" for 
systematic, electronic surveillance in the server infrastructure of all major telecom-
munication companies. These black boxes allow law enforcement bodies and security 
services to monitor all communication passing through the system, including text 
messages, internet traffic and phone calls. According to telecom insiders, the authori-
ties have the technical capacity to monitor 21 000 mobile phone numbers at the same 
time. This real-time monitoring is done through a direct connection; no further assis-
tance from telecom companies is needed. We believe the direct access to citizens’ 
communication data has been systematically abused and that, in practice, there is no 
or insufficient court oversight over this surveillance. 
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs should remove Black Boxes from the infrastruc-
ture of telecommunications companies. The existence of direct, unlimited access to 
peoples’ communications data undermines the concept of independent court over-
sight over interception and creates an intrinsic risk for abuse. Law enforcement 
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should only be granted access to data after acquiring a court approval (w/exceptions 
as defined by law), and access should be limited to the persons, numbers, topics and 
time period covered by the court approval. Furthermore, any access to track potential 
abuse. The government should not outsource surveillance activities to mobile opera-
tors and internet service providers but develop a process for obtaining data in consul-
tations with the judiciary, operators and the GNCC that is fully in line with the spirit 
of the law and that contains sufficient safeguards to prevent systematic, unchecked 
access to user data. 
 Transparency: The Ministry of Internal Affairs should regularly and proactively 
release aggregate information about the number of cases in which surveillance is ap-
plied, the number of applications rejected by courts, the type of surveillance used, the 
duration of these efforts, the aggregate number of individuals affected and the articles 
of the criminal code under which this surveillance measures were approved. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs should be open about the government’s communications 
data retention. The public has a right to know if and what telecommunications data is 
collected, how it is collected and stored by the authorities and how long such data is 
retained."72 
 Responsibility for individuals: Individuals should take more responsibility for 
their own personal data. Naive exhortations to conduct ‘awareness raising cam-
paigns’ must be replaced by a more sophisticated approach, using the tools above, to 
alert individuals to the consequences of their actions, educate them on the risk levels 
and provide them with the tools to take responsibility. Those providing these tools 
must recognize the complex psychological and mental factors, especially concerning 
the perceptions and attitudes toward risk that individuals have, for example negative 
discounting, the perception that it will ‘never happen to me’ and other mental models 
used by individuals when deciding how to trade off their personal information for an 
expected social or economic benefit. Finally, individuals must have a better apprecia-
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tion of the consequences of their behavior – however risky or not this might be. 
Whilst the right to privacy should be retained, there will invariably be consequences 
to exercising this right – and individuals must understand and be prepared to accept 
those consequences.73 
 Responsibility for those collecting or using personal data: Greater responsibility 
should be placed on organizations using personal data to use that data in accordance 
with the General Principles outlined above. Organizations, public and private, would 
have to take the initiative in choosing the most appropriate tool for their particular 
circumstance in accordance with local requirements, and would be held responsible 
for their decision removing opportunity for “abdication of responsibility”. The use of 
the tools will likely support the governance of the majority of the uses of personal da-
ta. There will always be a small minority that does not comply, either for reasons of 
error or more systematic failure. Enforcement should therefore be targeted at these 
organizations. More responsibility must rest with those using personal data, to take 
responsibility for their organizations and select which instruments are most relevant 
to their context and circumstance. In this way the market for personal data may be-
come more self-managing, requiring less bureaucratic prior authorizations, checks 
and process orientated monitoring.74 
The success or failure of privacy and data protection is not governed by the text of legisla-
tion, but rather by the actions of those called upon to enforce the law. It cannot be stressed 
enough that supervisory authorities must be given an appropriate level of responsibility for 
this arrangement to work. The stronger, results oriented approach aims to protect data sub-
jects against personal harm resulting from the unlawful processing of any data, rather than 
making personal data the building block of data protection regulations. It would move 
away from a regulatory framework that measures the adequacy of data processing by 
measuring compliance with certain formalities, towards a framework that instead requires 
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certain fundamental principles to be respected, and has the ability, legal authority and con-
viction to impose harsh sanctions when these principles are violated.75 
The legislation of a country as regards the personal data protection, even identical with the 
one in the European Union or other western countries, can be only a first step in addressing 
the right to privacy and personal data protection. Maybe more important than the legisla-
tion itself is the political decision to create and support an independent authority for the 
personal data protection with a minimum of competent personnel. This authority has then 
the responsibility of creating the right strategy for its purpose that should include awareness 
campaigns for the citizen’s rights related to personal data protection. These campaigns can 
be carried out even more efficiently in collaboration with the non-governmental organiza-
tions as well. The authority, in all its activities, must not forget the purpose of its creation: 
to safeguard the privacy and provide personal data protection for its citizens.76 
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